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When the United States Supreme Court in-structed lower federal courts to enforce Brownv. Board of Education1  “with all deliberate speed,” it made “vagueness and gradualism” its 
official policy for social advancement.2  Fifty years along the 
path of gradualism, has our society lost the ability to make con-
tinuing progress in combating racial discrimination? 
I argue that we have abandoned our commitment to the 
quest for equal treatment, largely because we have failed to un-
derstand the evolving nature of discrimination.  In this article, I 
raise the notion of “force” as an overarching theme that provides 
a means by which to understand the subtler nature of today’s 
discrimination and provides renewed justification for the legal 
regime used to combat it.  This article situates the notion of 
force within the employment discrimination context, partly to 
define a reasonable and representative scope of study, but also in 
response to the rich debate over the last ten years as to whether 
Title VII and other statutes regulating discrimination in the 
workplace should exist at all. 
THE NOTION OF FORCE
According to civil libertarian legal scholar Richard Epstein, 
Title VII is counterproductive because its inefficiencies cause 
the overall economic pie to shrink, as companies hire fewer 
workers and thereby decrease opportunities for those meant to 
benefit from antidiscrimination laws.3  Epstein argues that the 
market, operating without restrictions, would solve the problem 
of discrimination by accruing competitive advantage to those 
who do not maintain discriminatory practices.  In Epstein’s 
view, what small amount of discrimination remains is both toler-
able and, in fact, productive.4     
Richard McAdams presents an alternative economic theory 
of discrimination termed status-production,5 which posits that 
“discrimination and racist behavior generally are processes by 
which one racial group seeks to produce esteem for itself by 
lowering the status of another group.”6  Within this theory, 
McAdams argues that discrimination will persist in competitive 
markets even though discrimination is, from an economic per-
spective, inefficient and decreases overall wealth because it re-
sults in a diversion of resources and deadweight loss.7
McAdams presents three explanations as to why discrimination 
will persist in competitive markets:  (1) the power of discrimina-
tory social norms, (2) the existence of “reciprocity” (restricting 
social contact to ingroup members) between whites, and (3) un-
der certain circumstances, the effect of esteem-producing racial 
biases.8  According to McAdams, “the key to understanding 
[discrimination and racist behavior generally] is to perceive its 
subordinating quality.  Status comes about by disparaging oth-
ers, by asserting and reinforcing a claim to superior social 
rank.”9  These explanations highlight an important point: subor-
dinating another group achieves greater esteem for the subordi-
nator by denying the very act of derogation; hence, subtler forms 
of discrimination are more effective than overt ones.   
Epstein’s associational theory, by presenting a world in 
which individuals look innately within their own groups to de-
velop personal connections, lacks any coercive effect.  On the 
other hand, McAdams’ theory focuses quite acutely on the pro-
grammatic domination of one group by another.  This focus on 
force is crucial to the debate because it is force that provides the 
strongest justification for state intervention.  Epstein concedes 
that state intervention was needed in the Jim Crow South, rea-
soning that the explicit use of physical violence and coercion 
kept blacks from participating in markets.10  In his view, the 
distinction between that period and the present one is the ab-
sence of state-sponsored force, a shift he identifies as occurring 
in 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.  I argue that Brown merely required a change in the 
form of force.  In a way, the coercive force has moved under-
ground, and McAdams’ status production theory lays the foun-
dation for a more thorough explanation of discriminatory behav-
ior.  
While McAdams’ language sounds of deliberateness, or 
premeditation, in this article I consider the growing evidence 
that subconscious biases contribute to discriminatory outcomes, 
and place this dynamic within the broader notion of force.  In 
doing so, I reject Epstein’s sterile, almost placid, treatment of 
these phenomena as part of innate associational “preferences” or 
“tastes.”  Epstein states that Brown led to cultural and social 
changes to the very fabric of the South and asserts that this 
change resulted in a drastic reduction in the use of force that 
eliminated the need for legal intervention in combating discrimi-
nation.  He does not consider the possibility that previously ac-
ceptable behaviors would not be abandoned but rather replaced 
by new, subtler forms of subordination.  To establish the persis-
tence of force through new forms, then, would be to lay a strong 
challenge at the feet of Epstein and others who concede that 
state intervention was warranted in the Jim Crow South, but 
argue that such intervention is no longer needed today.
LINGERING FORCE: COGNITIVE                                 
BIASES AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES
The discriminatory behavior of whites in McAdams’ theory 
is understood as serving to produce and maintain social status.  
To this end, despite the influence of competitive markets, whites 
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use discriminatory social norms and what McAdams terms re-
ciprocity.  This behavior of whites, in McAdams’ approach, is 
treated as purposeful or intentional.  However, these same 
means, and resulting end, may be compounded by implicit atti-
tudes and unintentional motivations.  Indeed, they may even be 
the result of healthy cognitive functioning.  A study of these 
forms will buttress McAdams’ theory of status production while 
providing further evidence of ongoing force unaccounted for in, 
and contrary to, Epstein’s assumptions.
COGNITIVE BIASES AS FORCE
Linda Hamilton Krieger’s 1995 article, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, presents a detailed study of 
behavioral research on cognitive biases and their implications on 
established legal doctrine.11  Krieger explains that in the 1970s, 
psychologists began to recognize that intergroup biases could 
result not only from motivational processes but also from typical 
cognitive processes.  Called social cognition theory, psycholo-
gists began to identify “normal” cognitive processes like catego-
rization and information processing that could also create and 
reinforce racial biases.12  According to this view, stereotyping is 
a cognitive process, resembling categorization, that alters per-
ception, interpretation and other forms of information process-
ing in predictable ways.13
Social cognition theory suggests that individuals who may 
not harbor racist beliefs may nonetheless suffer from unintended 
but systematic prejudice as a result of categorization-like stereo-
types.  Behavioral experiments have shown that when individu-
als are divided into groups, even for trivial or random reasons, 
they display strong biases in their perception of differences and 
in the evaluation and reward of ingroup versus outgroup mem-
bers.14  Subjects perceive ingroup members as more similar and 
outgroup members as more different than when those same per-
sons are viewed in the absence of groupings.  In addition, sub-
jects are better able to recall undesirable behavior when commit-
ted by outgroup members instead of ingroup members, signifi-
cantly overrate the product of their own group in comparison to 
that of outgroups, and disproportionately attribute ingroup mem-
bers’ failures to situational factors (i.e. environmental or contex-
tual factors) and outgroup members’ failures to dispositional 
factors (i.e. personal attributes or traits).15   
In addition to categorization-based biases, social cognition 
theorists have also identified biases resulting from salience-
based cognitive distortions in perception and memory.  Studies 
have found that individuals judge the actions of minorities in 
more extreme ways when they are token members of a group 
than when they are members of a fully integrated group.16  In 
one study, white males and females evaluated law school appli-
cations containing incidental indications of the applicants’ race.  
Evaluators judged black applicants with strong credentials more 
favorably than otherwise identical white applicants, and judged 
black applicants with weak credentials less favorably than other-
wise identical white applicants.17
According to some theorists, these studies show that we pay 
more attention to stimulus objects that are more salient or dis-
tinctive, and as a result more information about these objects is 
perceived, encoded and stored in memory.18  Thus, because data 
regarding such stimuli are more available to the perceiver, im-
pressions formed under conditions of high attention have a 
greater valence, positive or negative, explaining the polarized 
evaluation phenomena.19  An alternative explanation of the po-
larization findings incorporates previous studies showing that 
individuals perceive ingroup members as relatively heterogene-
ous, or complex, while they view outgroup members as rela-
tively homogeneous.20 As a result, they have an increased appre-
ciation of complexities in evaluating ingroup members and 
greater awareness of the inadequacy of available information,21
and thus are more cautious in their judgments.22  In contrast, 
evaluations of undifferentiated outgroup members are more 
broad and inexact, generally either “good” or “bad.”23
The studies above regarding categorization and salience 
constitute cognitive sources of stereotypes and schemas, acting 
as a lens through which subsequent events are viewed.  How do 
these schemas influence behavior?  A 1980 study using school-
age children examined the effect of social schemas on the inter-
pretation of ambiguous information, presenting cartoon draw-
ings and verbal descriptions of a scene in which one student was 
poking a classmate in the back with a pencil.24  Asked to rate the 
behavior of the offending student, the study found that switching 
the race of the actor had a significant impact on the manner in 
which the children categorized the behavior.  Specifically, sub-
jects judged the behavior of black actors to be more mean and 
threatening, and less playful and friendly, while the opposite 
result obtained when the actor was white.25
A further example of schematic distortion affects how we 
attribute causes to events.  This analysis expands upon research 
regarding “fundamental attribution error,” in which people tend 
to underestimate the impact of situational factors and overesti-
mate the impact of dispositional factors.26  A variation on this, 
known as the “ultimate attribution error,” relates directly to the 
categorization-based biases identified above, showing that peo-
ple tend to attribute desirable ingroup behaviors to internal, dis-
positional factors but attribute similar behavior by outgroup 
members to environmental causes.27  One such study found that 
subjects perceived misconduct to be more likely to recur where 
the behavior was in accordance with stereotypes of the actor’s 
ethnicity than when stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-
neutral.  Furthermore, when misconduct was stereotype-
inconsistent or stereotype-neutral, subjects were better able to 
recall information about surrounding life circumstances of the 
transgressor.28
In the employment setting, the implications of these studies 
on how cognitive processes shape perceptions and influence 
behavior are numerous.  Racial minorities are more likely to be 
alienated as a result of overperceived differences and are more 
likely to have their work undervalued as compared to that of 
majority (ingroup) members.  In addition, any mistakes they 
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make at work weigh more heavily in their supervisors’ minds 
and are more likely to be attributed to personal, and not situ-
ational, factors, and hence result in more negative personal judg-
ments.  These concerns are only exacerbated by salience-based 
distortions, such that racial minorities in predominantly white 
employment settings are susceptible to evaluation in the ex-
tremes.  While the data also shows that their successes are also 
viewed more positively, the net effect may only be more alien-
ation from co-workers.   
In this setting, where there appears to be little room for er-
ror for racial minorities in the cognitive minds of their employ-
ers, the studies also show that minorities do not get the benefit 
of the doubt.  Instead, in the plethora of ambiguous circum-
stances that can arise in the workplace, existing schema and 
causal distortions will act to place a thumb on the scale against 
minority employees.  That is, it is likely that a racial minority 
involved in a verbal dispute in the workplace will not be seen as 
passionate or playful but aggressive and threatening; and, this 
aggressive and threatening behavior is more likely to be attrib-
uted to individual character than surrounding circumstances.  In 
this way, the conduct will appear worse, present less opportunity 
for mitigation or rehabilitation, and thus result in more drastic 
consequences.  Without ever injecting motivational or inten-
tional racial attitudes, cognitive biases present the possibility of 
just such a playing field.  This series of cognitive operations in 
the minds of employers did not cease the day Brown v. Board of 
Education was decided, nor did it cease the following day.   
IMPLICIT ATTITUDES
The operation of force via subtle, often subconscious and un-
knowing, discrimination is further evidenced through tests 
measuring explicit versus implicit attitudes.  Generally, these 
tests show that even individuals who believe that they hold no 
prejudices towards racial minorities nonetheless harbor such 
negative attitudes at a strikingly high rate.29  Unlike the cogni-
tive bias studies discussed above, which focused on bias-
creating effects (or byproducts) of otherwise normal cognitive 
functioning, implicit attitudes tests allow for the inference that 
individuals who believe they hold no negative racial prejudice 
nonetheless harbor such attitudes as the result of social condi-
tioning and cultural or other experiential factors.  While sharing 
the unintentionality of cognitive biases, implicit attitudes can be 
seen as closer to overt discrimination in that they reflect learned 
behavior or the suppression of previously held overt attitudes.30
They may also be confirmation of the cognitive bias effect, re-
flecting the inevitable progression of cognitive-based stereo-
types or schemas into implicit attitudes.  Either way, implicit 
attitudes present a second way of capturing the subtle force that 
continues to operate in the post-Brown era.   
 Implicit Association Tests (hereinafter “IAT”) are a method 
of indirectly measuring the strengths of associations among con-
cepts.31  IATs are presented on web-based computer interfaces 
in which instances of four concepts must be sorted using only 
two options, each of which is assigned to two concepts.32  The 
IAT rationale is that people will find it easier to sort a pair of 
concepts when they are closely associated than when they are 
weakly associated.  Ease of sorting is indexed both by the speed 
of responding and the frequency of errors, where faster respond-
ing and fewer errors indicate stronger associations.  Basically, if 
you respond faster when “white” and “good” are paired than 
when “black” and “good” are paired, your score would reflect a 
preference for whites.33
 Immediately prior to taking the IAT, subjects are asked to 
complete a short questionnaire asking about their explicit prefer-
ences among the concepts used in the upcoming IAT and includ-
ing basic demographic information.34  In this way, IATs are able 
to compare conscious, explicit attitudes against unconscious, 
implicit ones.  One study, conducted on the original IAT website 
between October 1998 and April 2000, consisted of 541,696 
interpretable tests,35 of which approximately 221,000 responses 
were black-white racial attitudes tests (both name and face-
based).36  Analysis of the preference among test takers found 
that 73% of test-takers automatically favor white over black, and 
as many as 88% of test-takers showed either pro-white or anti-
black preferences.37  On the explicit measure, whites showed a 
preference for white over black, but black respondents showed 
an even stronger preference for black over white.  However, on 
the implicit measure, whites showed a strong preference 
(significantly stronger than the magnitude of explicit preference) 
for white, while black respondents showed a weak preference 
for white over black.38
 New studies that place the IAT in various contextual set-
tings supplement the notion of environmental factors as the 
source of implicit attitudes and raise possibilities as to how we 
can combat the effects of these biases.  Studies have shown that 
situational factors, like receiving the IAT from a black experi-
menter or being shown pictures of, or made to think about, ad-
mired black individuals like Martin Luther King, Jr., Michael 
Jordan, and Bill Cosby, can lower bias scores.39 Similarly, test-
takers display reduced implicit gender biases when asked to re-
flect beforehand on certain questions, like “What are strong 
women like?”40
 In terms of implications on actual behavior, one study found 
that those test-takers who showed the strongest implicit racial 
biases, when given the option of working with a white or black 
partner, tended to choose a white partner.  Another experiment 
found that those who showed strong implicit preference for het-
erosexuals over homosexuals were more likely to avoid eye con-
tact and show signs of unfriendliness when introduced to some-
one who they were told was gay.  Finally, a German study found 
that volunteers whose results suggested more bias against Turks 
(an immigrant group in Germany) were more likely to find a 
Turkish suspect guilty when asked to make a judgment about 
criminality in an ambiguous situation.41
 While critics of both cognitive bias and implicit association 
theories exist, these studies are oft-repeated and consistent with 
traditional laboratory findings.42  Moreover, in analyzing the 
results of various experiments simulating different hiring-related 
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decisions, their explanatory power is tremendous.  For example, 
in 2003, Bertrand and Mullainathan conducted a now-famous 
study in which Boston and Chicago-area employers were sent 
fictitious resumes that were identical except for interchanging 
African-American and white applicant names.43  The study 
found that applicants with white-sounding names received fifty 
percent more callbacks from potential employers.44  Another 
famous study analyzed the hiring practices at eight leading or-
chestras dating back to the 1960s.45  In response to concerns of 
gender bias in hiring, many orchestras in the 1970s and 1980s 
shifted from conductors hand-picking new members to a blind 
jury-selection process in which applicants performed behind a 
screen in order to conceal their identity, creating a unique oppor-
tunity to test for gender-biased hiring.   The use of the screen led 
to a 50% increase in women advancing out of the preliminary 
rounds and a 30% increase in their chances of being hired in the 
final rounds.46     
Although interconnected, it is important to recognize that 
the source of cognitive biases and implicit associations are pre-
sumably different.  In one case, it is the cognitive processes that 
are considered healthy and crucial; in the other, it is the absorp-
tion of cultural and situational norms.  Together, they demand a 
shift in focus from our words and thoughts to our subconscious 
motivations.  Moreover, the force of cognitive biases is particu-
larly powerful because of where this manifestation occurs: at the 
subconscious level.  Greater esteem is achieved for a subordinat-
ing group when it can deny the act of subordinating, making its 
status appear innate or natural, as opposed to constructed.  
IMPACT OF SUBCONSCIOUS BIAS ON                                
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
By placing the operation of force, at least in part, at the cog-
nitive level and recognizing that even individuals who do not 
intend to discriminate are nonetheless influenced by implicit 
biases, it is possible to argue that discrimination is not the ex-
ception but the rule in today’s workplace.  Decisions in which 
ambiguity and subjectivity are abundant are highly susceptible 
to the influence of bias.  In the employment setting, subjective 
decision making is commonplace.  So, how much discrimination 
occurs in the workplace? 
Survey data on personal experiences with employment dis-
crimination suggest that while discriminators may not recognize 
that their decisions are clouded by subtle, subconscious biases, 
victims do.  According to national Gallup polls, the percentage 
of African Americans reporting that they were discriminated 
against “at [their] place of work within the last 30 days varied 
between 21% and 18% for the years 1997 through 2001.”47
Thirty-three percent of African Americans and Latinos reported 
that at least one time at their job, they were not offered a job that 
a white person got because of racial discrimination, and thirty-
one percent reported being passed over for a promotion that was 
offered to a white person because of racial discrimination.48
Researchers at Rutgers University conducted a 2002 study 
focused specifically on employees and found that 10% of em-
ployees said they had been “treated unfairly at their workplace 
because of their race or ethnicity.”  Among this group, 28% re-
ported being passed over for promotion, 21% reported being 
assigned undesirable tasks, and 16% reported hearing racist 
comments.  Among African Americans, over half of those sur-
veyed “knew of” discrimination in the workplace in the last 
year, and 28% had themselves experienced racial discrimination 
in the last year.  Given the pervasive nature of subtle forms of 
discrimination and the tiny percentage of employees perceiving 
discrimination who actually file claims, one begins to wonder 
not why there are so many employment discrimination claims 
but why there are so few.49
Admittedly, other scholars have considered the meaning of 
these subtle forms of discrimination on employment relation-
ships and the surrounding legal regime.50  My effort here is to 
place these ideas within a more comprehensive framework for 
understanding how discrimination operates in our society.  More 
narrowly, I hope these studies rebut the fallacy of Epstein’s 
force-free, post-Brown America.
MARKET FORCE: HOW BUSINESS CYCLES                  
EXERT DISCRIMINATORY FORCE
Here, my endeavor is to consider the relationship between 
market fluctuations and other force phenomena, including the 
subtle biases discussed above.  The employment setting is an apt 
one for the study of force.  For one, it is an area in which dis-
criminatory behavior has been historically pervasive.  Moreover, 
the plethora of data and statistics available for study provide a 
practical reason for studying employment discrimination.   
By way of background, in order for a complaint of discrimi-
nation to become a lawsuit in federal court, an employee must 
first file a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (“EEOC”).  After a brief investigation, the 
EEOC determines whether a case is worth pursuing.  If so, it 
may work with the parties to obtain a settlement or sue on behalf 
of the employee.  In all other cases, the EEOC issues a “right to 
sue” letter to the employee, at which point an aggrieved em-
ployee can file a lawsuit in federal court.51  Thus, the two major 
sources of data are the EEOC’s Annual Charge Statistics and the 
Judicial Facts and Figures maintained by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts.52
 The intuition regarding the relationship between business 
cycles and employment discrimination is simple: when unem-
ployment rates are low, jobs are available in abundance, so em-
ployees who experience discrimination have attractive alterna-
tives to litigation; when unemployment rates are high, jobs are 
scarce and employees will stay put in a discriminatory work 
setting, at least for a while.  Meanwhile, employers concerned 
about turnover and associated costs have fewer incentives to 
prevent such treatment during periods of high unemployment, 
when they can easily find attractive candidates to replace ag-
grieved employees.  A separate factor supporting this expected 
effect is that periods of greater unemployment will inevitably be 
accompanied by a greater number of discrimination-inducing 
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events – that is, layoffs and firings.53
Economists John Donohue III and Peter Siegelman con-
ducted a comprehensive empirical study of the explanations for 
fluctuations in the amount of employment discrimination litiga-
tion, based on data from 1970-1989.54  In part, Donohue and 
Siegelman were trying to understand why employment discrimi-
nation lawsuits in federal court grew 2166% from 1970-1989 
while the general civil caseload only grew only 125% over the 
same period.  As an initial matter, they found that the volume of 
employment discrimination displayed two patterns: (1) a general 
upward trend in the long- term, and (2) erratic fluctuations 
around this trend in the short-term.55  They also found that the 
combination of upward trend over time and the lagged unem-
ployment rates explained 96% of the variance in the number of 
suits.56
Applying a similar series of regressions to quantify the im-
pact of various factors likely to contribute to the long-term, up-
ward trend,57 Donohue and Siegelman concluded that almost 
20% of the increased volume of employment discrimination 
litigation over the period from 1970-1989 could be explained by 
rising unemployment.58
In one sense, unemployment rates themselves contain a 
racially discriminatory component.  Research shows that non-
white workers experience a significantly higher rate of unem-
ployment than white workers.  Unemployment rates among Af-
rican Americans and Latinos are consistently higher than for 
whites, and African Americans in particular have consistently 
experienced approximately twice the level of unemployment as 
whites.59  In this way, unemployment rates exert market force 
through their inherently racially-disparate functioning.  In the 
following section, I delve deeper into market operations to con-
sider how shifts in the unemployment rate may catalyze and 
exert force. .
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND EMPLOYER                            
BEHAVIOR AS FORCE
As economists acknowledge, weak labor markets may cre-
ate an incentive for employers to “indulge in discriminatory 
preferences” as a result of the excess supply of labor, with an 
available pool of workers that presumably includes many tal-
ented and qualified workers.  Employers may also see economic 
downturns as an opportunity to weed out minority employees 
who they perceive as underperforming or problematic by urging 
them to quit.  Economists question this incentive by pointing to 
the high cost of firing, suggesting that the costs of potential em-
ployment discrimination litigation create a disincentive to be-
have in a discriminatory manner, and thus neutralize the labor 
availability effect.60  However, this theory rests on the assump-
tion that a significant portion of individuals who are discrimi-
nated against will actually bring claims.  The assumption is 
hasty. 
In the Rutgers survey, discussed in Part II, supra, 34% of 
those who reported racial discrimination in the workplace did 
not do anything, and only 3% said that they actually sued their 
company or co-worker.  Among African Americans who per-
ceived discrimination, less than 1% (0.85%) actually filed a for-
mal complaint with the EEOC, and less than one quarter of one 
percent (0.22%) actually file a federal lawsuit.61  Indeed, an em-
ployer seeking to push people out could be quite successful in 
doing so without facing a lawsuit: at least four times as many 
people will quit than file a formal complaint with the EEOC, 
and 16 times as many will quit than file a suit in federal court.62   
Donohue and Siegelman engage in an extensive analysis of 
EEOC and federal court data to address the possibility of in-
creased employer discrimination during periods of high unem-
ployment.63  They conclude that no such rise in discriminatory 
behavior occurs among employers.64  In support of their conclu-
sion, Donohue and Siegelman identify several empirical find-
ings that contradict the causality of employer behavior.  First, 
they posit that the federal government would not experience 
incentives to discriminate in the way private employers would, 
and thus data showing that suits against the federal government 
follow the same unemployment-related pattern as suits against 
private employers can only be attributed to the worker benefits 
effect.65  Second, they note that the upswing in employment 
litigation begins within one or two quarters of the economic 
downturn, though it usually takes longer to satisfy the adminis-
trative and procedural requirements for filing suit in federal 
court, suggesting that increased federal court filings are based 
on complaints filed with the EEOC prior to the upswing in un-
employment rates (and any associated increase in employer dis-
crimination).66  Third, they find that while the number of federal 
court filings increase in recessions, the number of EEOC 
charges remains relatively constant, a pattern inconsistent with 
increased employer discrimination.67
Having laid out their argument against increased employer 
discrimination, Donohue and Siegelman go on to hypothesize as 
to the empirical results one may expect to find as a result of a 
worker benefits effect, eventually showing that the predicted 
results do indeed occur.  Under a worker benefits effect, periods 
of higher unemployment lead to increased durations of unem-
ployment, and therefore greater backpay awards.  Larger dam-
age awards result not only in the established increase in litiga-
tion, but also make cases with a lower probability of success 
more attractive by increasing the possible rewards of successful 
litigation.  Indeed, looking at figures from the same period, 
Donohue and Siegelman find a small decrease in plaintiff win 
rates and larger damages awards as unemployment rates rise.68
In sum, Donohue and Siegelman create a seemingly impenetra-
ble argument rejecting the employer behavior effect and lending 
strong support for a worker benefits effect.69
Nonetheless, I advocate for caution in interpreting their 
findings.  While the strength of their argument rests in its reli-
ance on empirical support from employment litigation data, so 
too may its weakness.  I argue that documented evidence of ju-
dicial hostility to employment discrimination litigation may very 
well poison the well of federal court data used in their findings.  
This hostility calls for a reinterpretation of their data to consider 
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the possibility of increased employer discrimination during eco-
nomic downturns.   
MARKET FORCE AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
The worker benefits effect essentially argues that, in eco-
nomic downturns, relatively little changes besides the cost cal-
culus of employees.  Even assuming this is true, I argue that the 
worker benefits effect should be understood within the rubric of 
force.  The fact that longer durations of unemployment make it 
more economically viable to bring a claim does not, in and of 
itself, imply that employees are bringing weaker or more frivo-
lous claims.  Indeed, the very nature of backpay awards creates a 
wage threshold whereby high-earning victims of discrimination 
are more likely to find it worthwhile to sue than low-earning 
workers.  The marginally lower-earning worker whose claim is 
made worthwhile by the increased length of unemployment is no 
less meritorious.  Instead, valuing a discrimination claim based 
on the length of unemployment, rather than the actual discrimi-
natory conduct, merely highlights the unfortunate impact – call 
it force – on low-wage victims of discrimination as a result of a 
backpay-based remedy structure.  After presenting evidence of 
judicial hostility in the next section, I consider whether victims 
of discrimination are penalized for bringing their claims during 
periods of high unemployment .
JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO EMPLOYMENT                       
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
In 1997, the Second Circuit instituted a task force to study 
the issue of gender, racial, and ethnic fairness in its courts.70
Generally, the task force began by surveying judges, court em-
ployees and attorneys about their observations of gender, racial, 
and ethnic bias in the courthouse.  In regards to bias directed at 
attorneys, the survey found that judges observed almost no ra-
cial or ethnic bias against minority attorneys, an observation 
shared by white male and white female courtroom employees.71
Among minority law clerks and courtroom deputies, on the 
other hand, 24% reported observing a minority attorney's com-
petence challenged because of his or her race or ethnicity, and 
19% report observing a minority attorney mistaken for a non-
attorney.72  Among minority attorneys, 39% reported that they 
"often" or "occasionally" observed various kinds of incidents of 
racial or ethnic bias directed at minority attorneys, including 
derogatory racial or ethnic comments; 46% reported being ig-
nored, interrupted, or not listened to; and 52% had been mis-
taken for a non-attorney.73
As previously noted, employment discrimination litigation 
in federal court increased by 2166% from 1970-1989, versus a 
125% increase in the overall civil caseload.  Between 1992 and 
1997, the volume of discrimination cases nearly doubled.74
Meanwhile, judicial attitudes toward employment discrimination 
litigation reflect what can only be described as disgust.  In a 
1994 New York Times article, a former federal judge complained 
that discrimination cases are an unjustifiable consumer of judi-
cial time because they are “rarely settled, are characterized by 
high levels of acrimony and subjective claims of victimization; 
they are immensely time consuming and are controlled by legal 
standards that, lacking sufficient precision, are overgeneralized 
and of marginal use.”75  The Second Circuit Task Force found 
that other judges privately agreed that the Times’ article cap-
tured the views of colleagues who felt the cases were "small 
potatoes," clogging up the federal courts and diverting judges' 
attention from larger, purportedly more significant, civil cases.76
Statistically, in the few employment discrimination cases 
that do make it to trial,77 plaintiffs are almost twice as likely to 
win before a jury as they are in a bench trial.78  From 1990 to 
2001, plaintiffs’ win rates before juries ranged from 36-44% 
while win rates before judges ranged from 14-33%.79  Despite 
plaintiffs’ minimal chances of making it to trial and obtaining a 
favorable decision, they fair even worse on appeal.  In fact, the 
differential between plaintiff and defendant success rates is 
greater in employment discrimination cases than any other cate-
gory of civil cases.80  When an employment discrimination de-
fendant wins at trial and the case is reviewed on appeal, only 
5.8% of those judgments are reversed. By contrast, when an 
employment discrimination plaintiff wins at trial and the case is 
reviewed on appeal, 43.61% of those judgments are reversed.81
Looking solely at post-verdict defense motions for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, proceedings with historically low 
rates of success, five out of six such appeals resulted in reversals 
in the Second Circuit from 1992 through 1995.82
In a sense, these results are not surprising.  There is little 
reason to believe that federal judges, who are predominantly 
white and the majority of whom are men, are any less suscepti-
ble than the general population to cognitive or implicit biases in 
decision making.  Perhaps, part of the problem can be attributed 
to a legal regime that is too onerous on plaintiffs and inconsis-
tent with the realities of modern discrimination.  In sum, anec-
dotal evidence of judicial attitudes, lower win percentages at 
trial before judges than juries, and the widespread perception of 
bias among minority employees (and attorneys), all evince a 
certain judicial hostility toward employment discrimination 
claims. 
A CRITIQUE OF DONAHUE AND SIEGELMAN
        Donohue and Siegelman fail to account for evidence of the 
increasingly aggressive use of summary judgment by defendants 
in the area of employment discrimination.83  In light of the evi-
dence discussed above, summary judgment effectively precludes 
the jury’s opportunity to perform its traditional duty while si-
multaneously transferring authority to hostile judicial decision-
makers.   
 Donohue and Siegelman argue that increased rates of settle-
ment and decreased plaintiff win rates at trial during periods of 
high unemployment lend support to the worker benefits effect.84
Assuming as they do that “weaker” claims (defined as those 
with lower probabilities of success) represent the majority of 
additional cases during market downturns, and that weak claims 
are likely to settle, increased rates of settlement and lower win 
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rates at trial support their theory.85  However, given the growing 
success of employer motions for summary judgment, in con-
junction with the proposal that the incremental, or additional, 
recessionary claim is weaker, employers should seek and win a 
greater number of summary judgment claims.  Therefore, a bet-
ter test of whether weaker claims are brought during recessions 
would study whether rates of summary judgment increased dur-
ing periods of high unemployment.86  Correspondingly, rates of 
settlement should have a smaller, or negligible, correlation with 
high unemployment.  Any actual increase in settlements, then, 
or findings showing a lack of correlation between summary 
judgment and increased unemployment, may instead reflect a 
greater quantity or magnitude of employer discrimination.87
Similarly, we know it is a rare employment discrimination plain-
tiff who refuses settlement, overcomes a motion for summary 
judgment and makes it to trial;88 presumably even rarer would 
be such a result for one who brings an incrementally “weaker” 
claim during a period of high unemployment.  Among the few 
cases that make it to trial, then, the win rates should remain rela-
tively constant.  Lower plaintiff win rates, in turn, may reflect 
judicial animosity.89
 One may be skeptical of the idea that judges are intention-
ally hostile to claims of discrimination, but subtle biases provide 
a way of understanding observed judicial hostility to employ-
ment discrimination litigation as the result of subconscious in-
fluences.   Unlike cell phones and cameras, subconscious biases 
are not checked at the courthouse door.  In fact, the differing 
perceptions of discrimination toward minority employees by 
white versus minority employees in the workplace90 are consis-
tent with the differing perceptions of discrimination towards 
minority attorneys by white versus minority attorneys and court-
room employees in the courthouse.91  Indeed, law clerks and 
courtroom employees identified behaviors that would reflect the 
operation of categorization-induced biases and negative sche-
mas, including challenges to the competence of minority attor-
neys and mistaken assumptions that they were non-attorneys.   
 The intentional-sounding theory presented previously, in 
which employers increase discriminatory force during periods of 
high unemployment, can be presented in nonmotivational terms.  
Employers seeking to make workforce reductions in order to 
take advantage of the large labor pool will likely seek to push 
out those who are seen as difficult or as underperformers.  
Again, this determination itself would be influenced by previous 
judgments contaminated by subtle biases.  In a recession, choos-
ing whom to terminate among a group of adequately performing 
individuals introduces greater ambiguity, and hence greater sus-
ceptibility to the effects of cognitive biases. Finally, subtle bi-
ases may also interact with market forces through the behavior 
of co-workers.  Innate ingroup preferences are likely to serve an 
unknowing status-producing end among white employees, such 
that individuals who are socially isolated from their work teams, 
who are more likely to be outgroup employees, would be most 
vulnerable.   
 These dynamics, if associated with market downturns, could 
cast doubt on Donohue and Siegelman’s findings.  For example, 
employer behavior in market downturns may place increased 
pressure on a set of vulnerable employees without increasing the 
number of total employees subject to discrimination, explaining 
the lack of cyclicality in EEOC charges.  Similarly, employers 
may take small steps to reduce costs or take advantage of in-
creased labor in anticipation of market downturns and associ-
ated increases in unemployment.  If so, the upturn in employ-
ment litigation within only two quarters after the onset of market 
downturns92 may be consistent with increased employer dis-
crimination.  While these dynamics present a rebuttal to 
Donohue and Siegelman, when understood in full they present a 
way of understanding the relationship between subtle biases, 
employer behavior and market conditions.  
A FORCE-BASED PRESCRIPTION
Through cognitive and implicit biases, we learn that nega-
tive racial attitudes are pervasive and affect decision-making on 
all levels, even among those who genuinely believe they are 
acting in a race-neutral manner.  The employment setting, 
wrought with ambiguous and subjective decision making at all 
stages of interracial interactions, from hiring to firing, raises 
basic questions about the sort of remedy, and proof structure, 
that should be implemented to combat such discrimination. 
The two major frameworks used to argue workplace dis-
crimination claims are disparate treatment and disparate impact.  
Under disparate treatment, an employee must prove that the em-
ployer’s decision was motivated by a racially discriminatory 
purpose.  Under disparate impact, employees can forgo a show-
ing of discriminatory purpose by identifying a facially-neutral 
employment policy that has a disproportionate impact, or effect, 
on racial minorities.93  In practice, neither adequately captures 
the operation of subtle forms of force.  Disparate treatment, with 
its focus on intent, or purpose, is immediately deficient.  More-
over, its traditional proof structure requires the identification of 
a similarly situated member of another race who was treated 
differently.  Yet cognitive biases teach us that employers, un-
knowingly, may perceive differences in qualifications or per-
formance between two virtually identical, or “similarly situated” 
individuals as a result of ingroup versus outgroup status.  This 
difference will then be articulated as a challenge to the em-
ployee’s attempt to identify a similarly situated individual.   
Disparate impact seems better suited to remedy discrimina-
tion rooted in the subconscious because of its substitution of 
effect for intent.  However, disparate impact theory, as applied 
currently, is also problematic.  First, it requires the identification 
of a specific, facially-neutral policy or practice that constitutes 
the source of the disparate impact.  Decisions infused with bias-
susceptible subjectivity do not easily lend themselves to this 
causal attribution.  We are not talking about an employer policy 
that says all employees must live within a two mile radius of 
work; we are talking about interviews, performance reviews, 
and everyday interactions that are capable of producing system-
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atically-biased outcomes.  Second, even if a causal relationship 
between a specific practice and a racially disparate outcome can 
be established, courts are likely to be extremely reluctant to tell 
an employer that they cannot engage in many of these practices, 
especially if the employer can prove that the practice is consis-
tent with business necessity.  
I argue for a bias-sensitive theory of discrimination in 
which disparate treatment still provides the basic framework but 
where the focus shifts from establishing that there was a dis-
criminatory purpose to establishing that discriminatory biases, 
explicit or implicit, permeated the employer’s decision.  In the 
process, evidence of racially disproportionate outcomes, di-
vorced from any particular practices, could constitute a single 
relevant factor in attempting to prove the role of force in deci-
sion making.  The crucial components, however, are the relevant 
facts and the inferences that can be drawn from them.94
By presenting a more accurate picture of how discrimina-
tion operates, force theory’s most useful contribution may be in 
providing guidance as to what facts are relevant and what 
weight should be given to each. For example, the cognitive bias 
studies discussed above suggest that cases involving minority 
employees who are in predominantly homogeneous groups, 
where they are “token” members of their race, should raise red 
flags.  These employees are more likely to be victims of ingroup 
preferences, are more likely to be judged negatively for ambigu-
ous actions, and are more likely to be judged harshly for rela-
tively minor performance deficiencies.  Similarly, regardless of 
the racial composition of the workplace, ingroup preferences 
will often be proxied by particular negative assessments of out-
group employees.  For example, social isolation caused by in-
group preferences may be seen as “not being a team player.”  In 
addition, the overall market conditions and unemployment rate 
may also provide useful contextual information about the force 
at play in the workplace at the time of relevant decision making.   
Similarly, cognitive biases suggest that certain inferences 
and presumptions should be given little or no weight in assess-
ing whether force contaminated an employment decision.  For 
example, because studies show that outgroup members are more 
likely to be judged in extremes, both positively and negatively, a 
few highly-placed African American executives within a com-
pany would provide little evidence of non-discriminatory deci-
sion making.  Similarly, evidence of bias in mental processing 
would advocate for the abolition of the “same actor” presump-
tion, a judicially-created legal standard holding that “where the 
hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of 
employment occurs within a relatively short time span following 
the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a 
determining factor for the adverse action taken by the em-
ployer.”95  As a result of cognitive biases, it is perfectly plausi-
ble that a hirer would recruit a minority employee and then later 
judge that individual negatively in various ambiguous situations 
because of unknowing biases.  Or, upon a single perceived defi-
ciency or error by a minority employee, the hirer may subcon-
sciously reorient the minority employee within a negative racial 
schema that he had previously thought the employee tran-
scended on the basis of her application or interview.  In turn, 
from that point forth, ambiguous situations are more likely to be 
understood in a schema-consistent way and these schema-
consistent activities are more likely than schema-inconsistent 
activities to be recalled by the hirer when making later firing, 
promotion and demotion decisions.  By presenting a more com-
plicated picture of decision making, where subconscious consid-
erations influence determinations, inferential shortcuts require 
questioning.   
Where factual circumstances play such an important role, 
factfinders should be armed with the tools to properly weigh 
relevant evidence.  By training federal judges on their own hos-
tility to employment litigation, statistical evidence of the preva-
lence of employment discrimination, and the impact of cognitive 
biases on decision making, judges may be in a better position to 
determine whether context-providing facts are relevant.  For 
example, courts may need to allow for more scrutinizing review 
of past performance, placing a greater burden on employers to 
justify negative determinations based on ambiguous conduct.  In 
addition, minority plaintiffs may be able to support an inference 
of bias by applying the common disparate treatment strategy of 
identifying ingroup members who were “similarly situated” but 
treated differently (more favorably).  Courts, in turn, must rec-
ognize the role of subtle biases in shaping the very determina-
tion of whether a given ingroup member was actually “similarly 
situated.”  As an example, an employer will likely deny that two 
employees are similarly situated by citing the minority em-
ployee’s greater number of warnings/reprimands, or by identify-
ing more negative performance evaluations.  Yet, the differing 
patterns of behavior may be nothing more than manifestations of 
the employer’s subconscious biases.  Therefore, courts should 
engage in a thorough review of past actions that constitute nega-
tive assessments to determine whether biases have contaminated 
employers’ very evidence of nondiscrimination.  Similarly, co-
worker testimony as to these previous disputes may prove infor-
mative (and could warrant more or less weight depending on 
ingroup or outgroup status, for example).  Finally, the strikingly 
common use of summary judgment is particularly disturbing, as 
the notion of force illustrates that factual circumstances in the 
employment setting are both complicated and conceptually cru-
cial.
In the section above, I have tried to present some of the 
implications of a broader notion of force on the current employ-
ment discrimination legal regime.  Specifically, subconscious 
biases and their relationship to judicial hostility present numer-
ous concerns as to the type of inferences that can accurately be 
made in interpreting fact patterns and the ability of legal deci-
sion makers - both judges and juries - to avoid the influence of 
the very same biases they are tasked with assessing.  
FORCE AND ROLE OF THE STATE
By engaging Epstein on the utility of the antidiscrimination 
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laws, a basic question arises as to the role of the state in regulat-
ing racially discriminatory conduct.  Epstein’s approach is basi-
cally that of the laissez faire capitalist, arguing for a hands-off 
approach in which discrimination will largely be eliminated by 
markets because of the costs of discriminating.  Under this ap-
proach, the Jim Crow South was an artificial construct and 
Brown v. Board of Education was the normalizing event that, by 
eliminating the state-sponsored exertion of discriminatory force, 
returned markets to their “natural” state.  The natural order re-
stored, markets are poised to do their noble work of eliminating 
inefficiencies and growing the pie.   
The rubric of force presents a different view.  Regardless of 
whether a return to a state of nature can be achieved, the force 
notion compels the view that such a state does not currently ex-
ist.  Instead, implicit biases suggest that pre-Brown attitudes 
may have found a new home in the subconscious.  Cognitive 
biases support this theory and further suggest that, at least as 
long as there are identifiable ingroup and outgroup members, a 
force-free state of nature may never exist.   
As a final point, a view of subtle biases as potentially omni-
present suggests that, because of a dearth of truly objective ac-
tors, a seismic realignment of the current legal regime may be 
needed.  Where all employment decisions involving racial mi-
norities are reasonably likely to be infected with racial bias,96
perhaps the presumption of nondiscrimination and the burden of 
proof should be reversed.  Indeed, the United States is in the 
minority in its use of the at-will employment presumption.97
Canada bars dismissals that are “unjust” or not supported by 
“just cause,” and nearly all European countries place a similar 
burden of good cause for dismissal on employers.98
The force notion raises questions about the viability of a 
model that shifts responsibility from the state to workers, who 
are treated as an army of “private attorneys general.”99  Where 
litigation is costly and the problem of discrimination is perva-
sive, placing the onus on businesses would serve to level the 
playing field by at least aligning burden with resources.100
CONCLUSION
Legal philosopher Robert Hale argues that coercive force is not 
created through the application of government regulation or the 
adoption of any particular legal rule.  Rather, the total amount of 
coercion remains constant while its distribution is shifted.101  For 
example, the choice of a particular rule of property, while en-
hancing the rights of the property holder, simultaneously places 
a restriction on the use of that property for all others.  Contrary 
to the suggestion by free market advocates that state regulation 
is the creation of coercion upon private parties, in reality these 
free market proponents simply advocate for a state of affairs in 
which the balance of coercion is struck at one extreme, which 
inevitably favors those with the most capital.  While the capital-
ists run amok, racial minorities are subject to the coercive force 
of history, culture, and cognition.  
 In the employment discrimination setting, anti-
discrimination laws ensure that the balance is not set at the free 
marketers’ extreme, but racial minorities nonetheless labor un-
der too heavy a burden.  Vulnerable to the cognitive bias and 
implicit attitudes of employers, the current balance places the 
onus on victims of racial discrimination to police what is a per-
vasive societal ill, permeating our collective subconscious, with 
little help.  The status quo asks racial minorities who suffer dis-
crimination in the workplace to seek redress in an unknowingly 
hostile judicial forum through the use of a set of clumsy legal 
rules that misunderstand the nature of the problem.  If equality is 
a goal that our society values, a new balance must be struck.
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